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Abstract
Background: The persistence of high maternal mortality and consistent failure in low- and middle-income countries to 
achieve global targets such as Millennium Development Goal five (MDG 5) is usually explained from epidemiological, 
interventional and health systems perspectives. The role of policy elites and their interests remains inadequately explored 
in this debate. This study examined elites and how their interests drove maternal health policies and actions in ways that 
could explain policy failure for MDG 5 in Uganda. 
Methods: We conducted a retrospective qualitative study of Uganda’s maternal health policies from 2000 to 2015 (MDG 
period). Thirty key informant interviews and 2 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with national policy-
makers, who directly participated in the formulation of Uganda’s maternal health policies during the MDG period. We 
reviewed 9 National Maternal Health Policy documents. Data were analysed inductively using elite theory. 
Results: Maternal health policies were mainly driven by a small elite group comprised of Senior Ministry of Health 
(MoH) officials, some members of cabinet and health development partners (HDPs) who wielded more power than 
other actors. The resulting policies often appeared to be skewed towards elites’ personal political and economic interests, 
rather than maternal mortality reduction. For a few, however, interests aligned with reducing maternal mortality. Since 
complying with the government policy-making processes would have exposed elites’ personal interests, they mainly 
drafted policies as service standards and programme documents to bypass the formal policy process.
Conclusion: Uganda’s maternal health policies were mainly influenced by the elites’ personal interests rather than by 
the goal of reducing maternal mortality. This was enabled by the formal guidance for policy-making which gives elites 
control over the policy process.   Accelerating maternal mortality reduction will require re-engineering the policy process 
to prevent public officials from infusing policies with their interests, and  enable percolation of ideas from the public 
and frontline.
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Implications for policy makers
• Policy elites are a fluid group with often unwritten interests ranging from self-interest, pragmatism to altruism – all of which should be keenly 
observed and regulated during the policy process to achieve public interest policy goals. 
• Since elites and their actions can sometimes be driven by unwritten personal interests which are contrary to written policy goals, pursuing the 
public interest requires recognising and seeking to limit the influence of other interests over policy-making. 
• Achieving accelerated reduction in maternal mortality in the post Millennium Development Goal (MDG) era will require reforms that will 
refocus policy actions back to the main causes of high maternal mortality backed by stronger mechanisms for holding policy elites accountable 
for their written policy goals.
Implications for the public
Examining the elite interests that drive policy actions is central to our understanding of why certain policies work or fail. These interests may not 
always be manifest. Efforts to explain why many low- and middle-income countries missed targets for Millennium Development Goal five (MDG 5) 
and continue to experience high maternal mortality have not paid adequate attention to the role of elite interests in policy failure.  This paper draws 
the attention of policy practitioners and scholars to the interests that underlie policies, to inform meaningful policy development. 
Key Messages 
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Background 
Elite domination and influence over the outcomes of policy 
processes is widely recognised in public policy literature.1-3 
Based on our review of literature on policy elites, we 
describe them as an organized group of actors defined by 
combinations of skills, access to vital information, social 
status, economic resources and institutional positions, who 
come together through common backgrounds, coinciding 
interests and social interactions.4-6 Their decisions regarding a 
perceived public problem constitute policy.6,7 For this reason, 
elite interests in the policy process have come under scrutiny 
across sectors.4
During the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) period 
(2000-2015), Uganda put in place several policies addressing 
MDG 5 concerning maternal health. Despite 15 years of 
sustained effort, high maternal mortality persisted. By the 
close of the MDG period, Uganda’s maternal mortality ratio 
was 368, below the target of 131, deaths per 100 000 live births.8 
Many studies examining performance of maternal health 
policies have paid significant attention to social determinants 
of health, epidemiological and health system factors, and 
effectiveness of interventions.9-12 Limited research has been 
carried out on decision-making, and particularly on the 
influence of actors and their interests over the performance 
of maternal health policies. A review published in 2013 
highlighted as a major limitation of the MDG framework, 
the infusion of vested interests into the MDGs by a small 
group of powerful global actors during the decision-making 
process.13 Another study carried out in 2014 suggests that 
Uganda’s health policies in the MDG period were influenced 
by a small group of powerful global and national elites with 
vested interests.2 This study builds on these works to advance 
our understanding of the exercise of power by policy elites 
to advance their interests in the policy process. We do so by 
providing an empirical account of the interests of policy elites 
and how they exerted influence over Uganda’s maternal health 
policies during the MDG period. We answer 2 questions: (1) 
what was the composition and power distribution among the 
elites who participated in the policy processes for maternal 
health in Uganda during the MDG period? (2) What were 
their interests and how did they influence Uganda’s maternal 
health policies in the MDG period? 
An Overview of Uganda’s Policy Process
The framework for policy-making in Uganda in the MDG 
period can generally be described as centralised. Policy-
making was framed as a central government activity by the 
1997 local government act.14 The processes, structures and 
actors were elaborated in the 2009 Government of Uganda 
generic guidelines for policy-making.15 In 2013, the health 
sector also established guidelines to synchronise its policy 
processes with overall government processes.16 Within this 
legal framework, all government policies are expected to 
follow the processes described below. 
Policy proposals are initiated by the minister of health 
informed by the ruling party agenda, cabinet and presidential 
directives, interest groups’ demands, global agendas, routine 
policy reviews and national development frameworks. This 
is followed by consultations led by senior Ministry of Health 
(MoH) technical staff in strategic positions, sometimes 
assisted by contracted external experts to generate ideas and 
draft the policy. The progress of the process is dependent on 
clearance by: (1) the cabinet secretary who ensures that every 
new policy addresses the priorities of government, (2) the 
ministers of finance, planning and economic development, 
and justice and constitutional affairs who issue certificates 
of financial and legal implications respectively for any policy 
proposals (these certificates are a legal requirement without 
which a policy cannot be approved), and (3) the president 
who clears the policy for no negative implications across 
government. Other stakeholders within government include 
actors from the MoH and related sectors of government. It also 
involves civil society organizations (CSOs), interest groups, 
academia, professionals and health development partners 
(HDPs) in the health sector. When ready, the draft policy 
(cabinet memorandum) is debated and once approved, it is 
either handed to the sector for implementation or forwarded 
into the legislative process if it requires a law or regulations to 
be operationalised. 
Elite Influence in the Policy Process 
We applied elite theory as an analytic framework to explore 
the interests of policy-makers/actors and how they exerted 
different forms of power to pursue their interest in the policy 
process. Our choice of elite theory is based on the nature of 
Uganda’s policy process which as elaborated, is centralised, 
and works through structures which are normally occupied 
by elites. We operationalise elites as an organized group of 
actors defined by combinations of skills/expertise, access 
to vital information, control over financial resources and 
holding strategic institutional positions, who come together 
through common backgrounds and coinciding interests.4-6 
These attributes confer power upon policy elites which they 
apply to exert significant influence on the policy decisions, in 
contrast to the public’s lack of power.5 This study focused on 
national policy actors. These are individuals who have specific 
responsibility for developing formal policies in the public or 
private sectors. Actors also encompass groups, agencies and 
organizations at national and international levels who seek to 
influence the formal policy process.17
Policy elites are divided into governing and non-governing 
actors6,18 The governing (formal) elites are policy actors who 
participate in the policy process because they are mandated by 
their positions in a government agency to make and enforce 
policies. The non-governing (informal) elites are policy actors 
who are not part of the official government structures and 
have their own (personal or organisational) strategic interests 
to protect and promote, but without whom the government 
would not function well.18
In our analysis, we examined elite interests as our central 
organising concept, operationalised as the preferences 
pursued by policy elites (governing and non-governing elites) 
in the policy process.19 Elite interests vary from self-interest, to 
pragmatism and public interest/altruism; and sometimes are 
interlinked. Self-interest is reflected in behaviours that seek to 
maximise personal benefits (economic, political or otherwise), 
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while minimising the personal, negative consequences.20,21 
Pragmatism is shown when less powerful elites adjust to 
accommodate the interests of the more powerful, as they try 
to find practical ways of addressing societal problems. Actors 
constantly monitor the policy environment and continuously 
adapt to its pressures as they strive to meet their policy 
goals.22 Public interest/altruism on the other hand entails 
“the outcomes best serving the long-term survival and well-
being of a social collective construed as a public,”23 sometimes 
pursued as a moral obligation to improve welfare.24 
The policy outputs arising from elite decision-making 
often reflect their interests, because they exert power to 
influence decisions during the policy process. Power is 
operationalised as the ability to exercise influence and control 
over the outcomes (decisions) of the policy process.18,25 It is 
applied in subtle or explicit forms26,27 to propel elite interests 
during decision-making.25,28 While power takes different 
forms, in this paper we have considered access and control 
over financial resources, control of vital information, skills 
(especially professional expertise) and positional power 
(including controlling the structures and managing the policy 
processes).29-32 We concurrently analysed how members of the 
different elite groups applied power in its different forms to 
advance their diverse, and sometimes interlinked, interests to 
influence maternal health policies (see Figure 1).
Methods 
Study Design
This was a retrospective qualitative study conducted at 
national level between April and July 2018. It focused on 
Uganda’s maternal health policies for the period 2000 and 
2015 (the MDG period). In this study, it is recognised that 
maternal health policies are generally considered with policies 
for reproductive health, basic care package and child health. 
However, the scope of this analysis was restricted to the 
maternal health component only. We adopted retrospective 
policy analysis because it is useful for generating critical 
lessons from past success and failures to inform future policy 
reforms.7
Data Collection Methods
Data were collected through document review, key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) (see Figure 2). 
We reviewed Government of Uganda maternal health 
policy documents to understand the actors, the roles they 
played and how they influenced maternal health policy 
process. We based our selection of these documents on the 
World Health Organization (WHO) definition of health 
policy as “decisions, plans, and actions that are undertaken 
to achieve specific healthcare goals within a society,”33 and 
Government of Uganda policy-making guidance.15 They 
encompassed policy guidelines and standards, presidential or 
ministerial directives, programme  strategic plans and explicit 
health policy documents. 
A free text search was conducted on the MoH document 
repository (http://library.health.go.ug/publications). The 
search terms used were: MDG, Millennium Development 
Goals, MDG 5, Maternal Health, Women’s Health, 
Reproductive health, Safe motherhood, Sexual and 
Reproductive Health, Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights, 
and, Adolescent Sexual Reproductive Health. 
A total of 217 documents were retrieved first scanned by 
title and then full text. Documents with any of the key search 
terms in the title (n = 34) were retrieved for evaluation. 
Inclusion criteria of documents for detailed review were: (1) 
meeting the qualification of a “policy document” as defined 
in this study, (2) an explicitly stated goal/objective of reducing 
maternal mortality anywhere in the content, (3) having a 
specific component of maternal health and, (4) covering the 
period 2000-2015. Only 6 documents qualified. Documents 
without a specific component for maternal health, not for 
the government of Uganda and not covering the period 
2000-2015 were excluded. More documents were identified 
through review of references (n = 2) and on recommendation 
 
















Decision/policy-making for maternal health  
Figure 1. Analytic Framework.
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by key informants during interviews (n = 1). 
In total 9 documents were reviewed (see Table 1). We used 
a document review template in Microsoft Word to extract 
the following from each document: (1) actors and the roles 
they played (these were generally listed in the sections of 
acknowledgements of the documents), (2) influence of 
actors (from situational analysis, policy context and rational/
justification sections), (3) policy provisions (from sections 
outlining policy direction/strategic framework/objective/
strategies).
We interviewed 30 key informants and conducted 2 FGDs 
with selected members of the MoH Technical Working Group 
for Maternal and Child Health and the CSOs’ Coalition on 
Maternal Health. The purpose was to triangulate data and 
generate first-hand experiences on the roles elites played, 
their interests and how they exercised power in the policy 
processes. Key informants were identified during document 
review and, subsequently, through snowball sampling. The 
inclusion criteria were: (1) being a national policy-maker/
actor and, (2) having directly participated in policy-making 
for maternal health in Uganda between 2000 and 2015 (MDG 
period). Participants were drawn from all the stakeholder 
groups acknowledged in the policy documents reviewed 
(see Table 2). Key informants provided detailed insights on 
how elite interests and power played out during the policy 
process while FGDs provided a wider scope of views on the 
elite interests that influenced decision-making. We used 
an interview guide in both cases with four broad guiding 
questions: (1) as one of the participants in making maternal 
health policies in Uganda between 2000 and 2015 (MDG 
period), briefly tell me what they entailed. (2) Which other 
participants/groups do you remember getting involved in 
maternal health policy-making, and what roles did they 
play? (3) What were you and other policy-makers trying to 
achieve in those policies? (4) How did you and those who 
participated in policy-making for maternal health go about 
achieving the intentions you have stated above? By answering 
these questions, participants spoke about their interests and 
power, and those of other elites who participated in policy-
making. 
Ensuring Rigour
To identify the most relevant documents and study 
participants, we applied clearly spelt out criteria. Sequencing 
data collection starting with document review, followed 
by key informant interviews and concluding with FGDs 
facilitated triangulation of data and methods. We started with 
document review to familiarise ourselves with the policies, 
actors and context. This informed purposive selection of 
more documents to review and identification of actors 
to consider as study participants. Document review also 
informed the sharpening of guiding question and potential 
areas to probe during the interviews. Iteration between 
document review and interviews was done to follow up and 
clarify emerging issues during the research process. To gain 
rounded insights on the experiences, we interviewed different 
people at the same level (horizontal interviewing) and across 
levels (vertical interviewing) within the structures of policy-
making. The entire data collection process took four months, 
allowing saturation in data collection.
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Data analysis was informed by a constructivist – interpretive 
paradigm which attempts to generate meanings and 
explanations about social realities based on participants’ 
experiences and perceptions.34,35 We followed the 3 steps 
Figure 2. Schema for Document Review and Interviews. Abbreviations: FGD, focus group discussion; KI, key informant.
 
 
Review of references and 
recommendations by KI 
participants 3 
Initial search 217   
Excluding duplicates  
Evaluation for inclusion 34 
Meets policy document definition  
Title includes any of the key words  
Excluded by title 183 
Interviews (KI n=30, FGD n=2) 
Excluded 28  
Upload of transcripts in 
Nvivo 12 and coding  
Analysis 
Detailed review and transcription 6 
Initial respondent list generated  
Total reviewed 9 
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of thematic analysis described in literature36 (as recently 
operationalised in a study in Tanzania37). All interviews 
were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interview 
transcripts and filled document review templates were 
uploaded in Nvivo 12. Based on the study questions, all data 
were inductively coded line by line to identify the actors, their 
roles, interest and influences in the policy process. The lead 
author generated query reports which were independently 
reviewed by the third, fourth and fifth authors. Descriptive 
codes and analytic themes were jointly developed by all 
authors.
We applied the analytic framework by: first, describing 
the elite group and their different sources of power, second, 
identifying elite interests of altruism, pragmatism and self-
interest as the main analytic themes, and different forms 
of power applied by the actors to pursue their identified 
interests during the policy process (Figure 3). Since actors 
are identifiable with the various policies (they are listed in the 
acknowledgement sections of policy documents), we made 
limited and cautious use of explicit examples of policies in 
the presentation of findings. Instead, emphasis was put on 
elaborating the elite interests underpinning the maternal 
health policies we considered and the different forms of 
power at play. 
Interests were analysed as the main themes and described by 
corresponding subthemes, then linked to the different actors 
and how they exercised power to influence maternal health 
policies. Analytic rigour was achieved through inductive 
thematic saturation, by ensuring that the codes and themes 
were exhaustive.38
Results 
Uganda’s stipulated policy process vests policy-making in 
central government structures which are predominantly 
controlled by the policy elites. Although on paper it appears 
to be a simple process, in reality it is complex as multiple 
subgroups have unequal access to different sources of 
power, as well as different interests. Senior MoH officials, 
Table 1. Main Policy Documents That Set Maternal Health Direction in the MDG Period
Policy Documents Period Justification for Selection 
Health sub-district policy 1999 to date Bring caesarean section services within 5 km to the families 
National health policy 1999-2009 Overall policy framework for the health sector 
The national policy guidelines and service standards for reproductive health 
services 2001-2005 Sets specific goals for RH where maternal health falls
The national policy guidelines and service standards for sexual and reproductive 
health and rights 2006
Updated specific goals for RH where maternal health 
falls
Roadmap for accelerating the reduction of maternal and neonatal mortality and 
morbidity in Uganda 2007-2015
Set specific goals for maternal health for the MDG 
period 
Second national health policy 2010-2020 Updated of the overall policy framework for the health sector
Adolescent health policy guidelines and service standards 2011 Specific focus on maternal health for adolescents 
Ministerial directive on maternal death notification May 10, 2011 Set new policy direction for maternal death review to include criminal investigation and prosecution 
Reproductive maternal, new-born and child health sharpened plan for Uganda 2013-2015 Update of policy focus for maternal health to “selective high impact interventions”
Abbreviations: MDG, Millennium Development Goal; RH, reproductive health.
Table 2. Categories of Participants by Type of Interviews Conducted
Category Number Interviews
HDPs (WHO, UNFPA, World Bank and USAID) 4
Maternal health researchers 2
Consultants on policy development for maternal health 3
MoH officials 5
Retired MoH officials 5
Agencies affiliated to MoH (Uganda Blood Transfusion Services, Health Service Commission, National Medical Stores) 4
Senior politicians (parliament and cabinet) 4
CSO leaders 2
Health professional associations 1
CSO Maternal Health Coalition (FGD) 1 (n = 10)
MoH Maternal and Child Health Technical Working Group (FGD) 1 (n = 8)
Abbreviations: HDPs, health development partners; WHO, World Health Organization; UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund; USAID, United States Agency 
for International Development; MoH, Ministry of Health; CSO, civil society organization; FGD, focus group discussion.
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some members of the executive, and HDPs had significant 
influence on maternal health policies. This was because 
they occupied strategic positions (technical or political), 
controlled specialised government or global information on 
maternal health, they had access to financial resources and 
expertise. Policy elites, acted in a self-interested manner most 
of the time – especially to win elections, earn economic gain 
and build personal legacies. In some instances, however, they 
acted pragmatically by aligning with global maternal health 
funding streams and pursuing maintenance of organisational 
programmes or employment. There were a few instances of 
where policy elites acted altruistically, demonstrating concern 
to end preventable maternal deaths (achieve policy goals). In 
the presentation of the detailed results below, we first examine 
elite composition and power distribution, then present a 
detailed account of elite interests and influence in the policy 
processes for maternal health. 
Elite Composition and Distribution of Power
Composition of Actors Who Participated in the Policy Process 
for Maternal Health
The main actors who participated in the policy process for 
maternal health in Uganda fit the description provided in 
elite theory. They were located at central level, wielding 
power and had exclusive access to the policy process. The 
actors who played roles in the processes were drawn from 
both the governing elite, those occupying government 
positions with mandate to make public policies, and the 
non-governing elite, from outside government structures. 
The governing elite included: the president, members of 
cabinet, members of parliament, officials from the ministry 
of gender and social development, representatives of medical 
and nursing regulatory bodies, senior and mid-level staff of 
MoH, researchers from Makerere University Medical school 
and experienced national level maternal health services 
providers. The non-governing elite, on the other hand, were: 
representatives from the private not for profit providers 
of healthcare, HDPs, members of the Maternal and Child 
Health Technical Working Group (MCH TWG) and national 
consultants (Table 3). 
The Government of Uganda guidelines for policy-making 
provide for the participation of various groups of actors in 
the policy process. However, analysis of actors who actually 
participated in 9 selected maternal health policies, showed 
that there was variable involvement of the different groups, 
and some were completely left out of the policy process. The 
policy process for maternal health was dominated by MoH 
officials, national consultants and HDPs. Members of the 
executive only participated in 3 of these policy processes. 
On average, other governing and none governing policy elite 
groups participated in 3 out the 9 policies analysed.
Power Distribution Among Policy Elites 
Across all elite groups, power was unevenly distributed. Actors 
in political positions such as elected national representatives 
and members of the executive derived significant power from 
their formal positions. They had powers to appoint senior 
MoH bureaucrats, appropriate national budgets and approve 
all government policies. Their power was referred to as veto 
power – they wielded power to stop the policies at any stage 
in the process. In practice, however, they were bypassed for 
most of the policies. The second sub-group included senior 
bureaucrats in the MoH, National experts (consultants) and 
HDPs. Senior bureaucrats in the MoH have expertise around 
maternal health accumulated over many years of professional 
public service, access to extensive national health information 
and they occupy strategic positions in the structures that 
govern the policy process. These actors stewarded policy 
formulation from inception to completion. National experts 
(consultants) and HDPs, even though they are not part of 
the governing elite, had substantial power and access to 
the structures controlling the policy process. They derived 
power from technical expertise, latest national and global 
information, their positions and financial resources to fund 
policy formulation and implementation. Other members 
of the governing and non-governing elite mainly had 
information and expertise. Their participation in the policy 
process was on invitation by the elites with more power and 
their ideas were advisory only. 
From the above analysis of power distribution among 
policy elites, we unpacked the 2 generic groups described 
in elite theory and identified 3 elite subgroups (Figure 4). 
First, a small group with unlimited access and control of the 
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Figure 3. A Step by Step Analysis of Elite Influence in the Policy Process. Abbreviations: CSOs, civil society organizations; HDPs, Health development partners.
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very senior bureaucrats occupying strategic positions in 
MoH. They are experienced and generally highly trusted 
by members of the subgroup with veto power (we explain 
this later). Through their positions, they derived power to 
convene the policy processes, setting terms of reference for 
consultants, determining the actors to invite to participate 
and clear policy content. HDPs and national consultants 
were also in this group. HDPs provided technical expertise 
directly through the secondment of experts or consultants, 
and funded the policy process and implementation through 
health sector budget support, vertical programmes and CSO 
funding. The national consultants designed and wrote the 
policies to conform to the terms of reference. The second 
subgroup, comprised of mid-level bureaucrats within MoH, 
other bureaucrats across government, researchers and other 
members of the non-governing elite. Their main source 
of power was expertise and information, warranting their 
being consulted to contribute ideas in the policy process. The 
third group comprised of very senior policy actors with the 
mandate to approve and oversee overall government policy 
– the majority of whom hold political positions. This last 
subgroup, generally, should have the final say on the fate of 
any policy of government and can stop it at any stage, and so, 
as discussed, they have veto power: the power to block policy.
In practice, in the maternal health policy experiences 
(Table 3), elites from the inner circle (Figure 4), took the 
lead throughout the policy process. They wrote maternal 
health policies and managed the rest of the elites in the policy 
process. Elites in the middle circle participated on invitation 
by the members of the first group to contribute their ideas. 
Elites in the overarching outer circle only occasionally 
participated in the policy process directly or through 
directives, guidance and resolutions. For example, the 
president and parliament only engaged in 3 out of the 9 
processes reviewed. The ministers of finance, planning and 
economic development, and, justice and constitutional 
affairs, and the cabinet secretary did not engage in any of the 
9 processes (Table 3). Two reasons explain this. First, in some 
cases, they were cautiously bypassed, as policies were written 
in the form of programme/project documents, guidelines or 
strategies – a category of policy documents that does not have 
to go through all the established government policy processes. 
Table 3. Main Actors Involved in Maternal Health Policies in Uganda in the 2000-2015 (MDG) Period and Their Sources of Power
Actors Number of Maternal Health Policies in Which Actors Participated (n = 9) Power 
Governing elite 
with veto power
Minister of finance, planning and economic 
development 0 Position, control over national budget   
Minister of justice and constitutional affairs 0 Position, expertise on legal matters 
Cabinet secretary 0 Position 
Other members of cabinet 3 Position 
Members of parliament 2 Position, control over national budget 
President 2 Position, control over national budget, Access to privileged information
Minister of Health 6 Position, expertise on health 




Senior MoH staff 8 Position, expertise on health, control of national health information 
Governing elite 
who play advisory 
role
Other MoH midlevel staff 8 Expertise in planning and maternal health
Representatives from National Population 
Secretariat 3
Control over information on population 
dynamics, expertise on population 
matters 
Members of medical and nursing regulatory 
bodies 5 Expertise 
Researchers from Makerere University Medical 
School 3
Subject matter expertise, control of 
research information 
Experienced national level maternal health 
service providers 3 Expertise in maternal service delivery
Non-governing elite
Private not for profit health representatives 3 Financial resources 
CSOs 5 Information from the grassroots  
HDPs 7
Expertise, information on global 
developments, position, financial 
resources 
National consultants 8 Expertise, information 
MoH MCH TWGa 2 Expertise, position 
Abbreviations: MDG, Millennium Development Goal; CSOs, civil society organizations; HDPs, health development partners; MoH, Ministry of Health; MCH 
TWG, Maternal and Child Health Technical Working Group.
a It is one of the multi-stakeholder committees provided for in the MoH policy development guidance with membership drawn from maternal health 
professionals, researchers, DPs and CSOs. It provides technical advice to MoH on national maternal health policy and programs.
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Respondents argued that this type of document would not be 
subject to the formal procedures involved in the formal policy 
process. Second, some members of the elite group with veto 
powers actually knew about the policies being developed 
but preferred to have them as strategies and programme 
documents. This was to avoid committing government to 
financially support them, and to avoid political repercussions 
in case of failure. 
“If you pass them (programmes/projects) as policies, they 
would require budgetary allocation and parliament can insist 
that they are implemented through budgetary allocations 
because they pass the budget. Government (the executive) 
made sure that it kept quiet to avoid to be put to task because 
members of parliament are representatives of people, they are 
stakeholders in these things. When cabinet has not endorsed 
it, parliament cannot force but it can only advise – which is 
not enforceable” (S_P_01). 
Breaking down policy elites into clear subgroups helps 
build a clear understanding of their dynamic interactions in 
the policy process. It also assists in deciphering elite interests 
and the exercise of power by the different groups during the 
policy process.
Elite Interests Shaping Policies for Maternal Health
As discussed earlier, the elite interests that shaped maternal 
health policies can be categorised into 3 domains: (i) self-
interest, especially political and economic gain, (ii) pragmatic 
choices, balancing self-sustenance goals, doing something 
about maternal mortality and meeting the conditions for 
programme funding, and, (iii) a primary concern for ending 
preventable maternal death. 
Elite Self-interests 
From the interviews, the self-interests pursued by elites 
were, broadly, private economic and political gain. Political 
interests were pursued by members of the governing elite 
holding political positions acquired through elections or 
political appointment. These interests were threefold: vote-
winning, establishing personal legacies and maintaining 
political appointments. 
 
Actors with veto 
power to approve 
and oversee policy 
across government 
Actors who 
contribute ideas in 
the policy process 
Actors who control 
structures and 
processes of policy-
making (they write 
policies)
Figure 4. Constituent Subgroups of the Governing Elite Based on Distribution 
of Power.
Vote Wining 
Political elites used their positional influence and control over 
the national budget to pursue their vote winning interests. 
They prioritised constructing buildings which could easily 
be showcased during election campaigns, rather than less 
tangible provisions like skilled birth attendance, quality of 
care and health facility functionality. Interventions considered 
difficult to display were not prioritised. They deflected public 
scrutiny regarding poor health services onto health workers, 
referring to them as obstinate and saboteurs of government 
programmes. 
“There is a time when there was a promise that Health 
Centre IVs (HC IVs) would be functional, the structures 
were built they ended up as shells with no human resources, 
where human resource was deployed, you would find no 
equipment or you would find a doctor but no anaesthetic 
specialist. Politicians operated under a cover-up. One time, 
a maternal death occurred in [facility withheld], politicians 
claimed the health workers had refused to work on her (the 
deceased) after she failed to buy drugs and supplies. Later 
on, I heard that some people (within the political class) were 
seen ferrying supplies to the facility so that they claim that 
supplies were available” (Interview: PA_XPT_01).
Respondents from CSOs (n = 2), MoH (n = 2) and some 
politicians (n = 2) suggested that politicians developed 
“policies with broad goals and ambitious targets,” which 
would not bind them to specific maternal health outcomes. 
Participants said such policies were written in technical 
maternal health language to convey “good” intentions while 
paying lip service to maternal health needs. For example, some 
respondents questioned policies on free health services for all 
wondering “why politicians were not truthful to acknowledge 
that government could not look after everyone – and encourage 
citizens to contribute for their health” (PA_XPT_01). An MoH 
respondent also noted: 
“…it (Health Centre IV) was political. Do you know where 
these budgets came from? They were manifesto budgets. 
So, you see where the drive was coming from, there was a 
certain agenda that has to do with getting votes, not tangible 
maternal health gains” (Interview: MOH-STF_IS_01). 
 Some respondents who played key roles in drafting some 
of the policies had this to say: “in some cases, we were ordered 
to put certain targets- saying you cannot say that all those 
people will die and we are in charge” (NC_XPT_01). They 
set ambitious targets to portray “commitment to ending 
preventable maternal deaths” even when they knew such 
targets were difficult to achieve in the circumstances. When 
we reviewed the targets for reducing maternal mortality 
which were to be achieved by the various maternal health 
policies during the MDG period, we found that all of them 
have to date not been achieved.
Advancement of Personal Legacies 
Some policies were developed to advance the personal legacies 
of individuals. MoH respondents (n = 2) gave us an insider 
account of how political appointees exerted their positional 
power to “push for policies which they would be remembered 
for” during their tenure at MoH. They normally referred to 
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such policies as ‘my baby’ – a term used to associate policies 
with specific individuals. Experts (n = 2) and a politician (n = 
1) also shared similar experiences. While they recognised that 
maternal health benefited in the process, it was also affected 
by the volatility associated with turnover both among such 
actors and policy initiatives (despite problems remaining the 
same). It was observed that in pushing forward their interests, 
their positions and actions on any issue effectively became 
policy. Respondents from the MoH referred to such actors as 
“the policy.” Such policies were usually issued in the form of 
directives and circulars and were difficult to rescind. 
“If you listen to the ministry of health colleagues, they will 
tell you that policy was my baby, I had to make sure that it 
works, now you want to destroy it. They would overpower 
everyone else, set aside previous policies and come up with 
their own policies” (Interview: MoH_RTD_STF-01).
Maintaining Political Appointments
Political appointees, faced the dilemma of keeping their jobs 
and delivering on maternal health. Their contracts were 
subject to approval by members of the elite sub-group with 
veto power who included senior politicians and bureaucrats. 
Participants from MoH said that these appointees were 
preoccupied with retaining their positions by taking care of 
the interests of their appointing authority. Maternal health 
followed after “what puts bread on their dinner tables” was 
secured. During the policy process, they used their positions 
to take care of their personal interests by carefully considering 
the interests of the elite group with veto power to avoid any 
confrontation that would jeopardise their appointments. 
They adjusted their decisions to suit those of their appointing 
authority. This gave rise to some policies which were difficult 
to implement or ended up hurting the system. For example, 
participants referred to a controversial policy directive linked 
to quality improvement which defined maternal death in 
part as a crime committed by healthcare providers, subject 
to criminal investigation and prosecution. Respondents from 
the FGD with the MCH TWG (comprising of actors from 
MoH and CSOs) said that front line implementers became 
reluctant to implement quality improvement processes given 
the directive, while other health workers resorted to rewriting 
medical notes in case of a maternal death, to “clean up” the 
file in case of any potential criminal liability. Some files even 
disappeared. 
Economic Interests
Participants from CSOs (n = 2), MoH (n = 2) and experts who 
facilitated some policy processes (n = 2) held the perception 
that some governing and non-governing elites (some MoH 
actors and consultants, respectively) were driven by potential 
monetary gain in relation to the policies developed on 
maternal health. Using their expertise and positional power, 
they would seek grant opportunities from among the HDPs. 
They used maternal health as a flagship programme to attract 
such grants for activities which on top of maternal health, 
served their personal economic interests. Respondents said 
such policies were introduced as projects operated at the 
MoH headquarters as vertical programmes to maintain 
central control. They prioritised actions such as meetings, 
consultations, document production, dissemination, office 
furnishing, quarterly fuel advances, vehicle procurement and 
maintenance, and supervision. It was observed that these 
actions did not sufficiently target maternal mortality. Some 
respondents referred to the elites who were involved in writing 
and management of grants for maternal health as “dealers in 
MoH,” meaning shrewd bureaucrats who used their positions 
to direct policy in favour of their personal interests. One 
respondent said;
“Uganda became money, money, money we were all looking 
for money. Everybody was looking for a project that would 
enhance their pockets. Nobody was looking for resources 
just to merely address maternal death. The leadership at 
the ministry of health was focusing on how much money 
they would get (interpretation: there was always a hidden 
personal agenda for any resource mobilization)” (Interview: 
NA_NGE_-01).
Some respondents (n = 2) acknowledged that they were 
earning income through facilitating policy processes. 
According to them, the terms of reference for developing 
programme/project and policy documents were underpinned 
by more than technical maternal health issues – there were 
underlying client interests of which they took account when 
they wrote the documents. During the policy process, their 
focus was on what they understood as their clients’ interests. 
Members of the elite group controlling the policy process 
said that they had to balance technically sound interventions 
and implementation arrangements with the interests of their 
clients (such as additional facilitation, travel, office furnishing 
and new vehicles with generous fuel provision) for the 
document to be accepted. The actors were driven not by the 
problem of high maternal mortality but the existence of a grant 
opportunity and it was the possibility of marketing maternal 
health as a flagship idea to win the grant that mattered. As one 
of them said: 
“…whenever it rains in Geneva, we bring out our 
umbrellas in Kampala to go and work. NC_XPT_02. 
Another one added: It is lucrative, you sit in a hotel, you 
excite them (donors and government officials) and get paid” 
(NC_XPT_02). 
Pragmatic Self-sustenance 
As with economic interests, pragmatic self-sustenance also 
emerged as a shared interest of some members of the governing 
and non-governing elite who had unlimited access to the 
structures that controlled the policy process. Within MoH 
and among some CSOs, maternal health was the mainstay of 
their programmes and maintaining those programmes over 
time was important to them. Funding organisations (HDPs), 
meanwhile, had an international development agenda, but 
employed local staff to implement that agenda. To maintain 
their jobs, local staff advanced the goals of their employers 
by offering development support/funding to MoH and CSOs. 
Respondents from funders (n = 2) and CSOs (n = 1) noted 
that the funding organisations would make available grants 
with specific goals targeting maternal health. CSOs would 
then develop programmes aligned to the grant and targeting 
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advocacy of maternal health with MoH. On the other hand, 
MoH would develop a programme/project also aligned to the 
grant to support its programme. The activities of all groups 
aligned with the funders’ development support goals whilst 
also allowing both the MoH and CSOs to attract funds to 
sustain their maternal health programmes and their local staff 
members to maintain their jobs. In effect, then, all of them 
continued to survive by aligning with maternal health as a 
trending global health agenda - and even when not the initial 
or underlying concern (Box 1).
Some respondents from among the HDPs reported 
experiences of leveraging the positional power of senior MoH 
bureaucrats to support drafting of policy documents. They 
funded high-level national ceremonies with media coverage 
to obtain endorsement in form of a statement (speech) read by 
the chief guest (but written for him/her by MoH bureaucrats, 
sometimes with the input of the HDP) or publicly signing a 
copy of the documents. One of the HDP respondents said 
thus:
“They (government of Uganda) did not decide much, 
partners came and wrote policies but of course in the presence 
of MoH officials. Our goals would be documented, endorsed 
and owned by government as policy. All these processes 
were facilitated by partners through funding, technical 
support and representatives of government would only sign 
documents” (Interview HDP_FH_01). 
Respondents noted that given the pursuit of funding, 
maternal health programmes and policies often mimicked 
global imperatives (see Table 4) rather than being adapted 
to the national context. Several policies and programmes 
consequently followed after global commitments rather than 
the changes in the national dynamics of maternal mortality. 
One respondent narrated the story of a policy s/he spearheaded 
which started as the project of a HDP with which s/he was 
working. S/he said that the HDP was interested in child health, but 
needed to use maternal health as an entry point for it programme. 
All the interventions targeted the child while neglecting the 
mother. S/he said the HDP, provided a huge project grant to start 
implementation in selected rural areas. They used the project 
results and the promise of programme funding to influence 
policy. By the end of the first phase of project implementation, 
it evolved into a national policy. On reviewing the related policy 
developments, we confirmed that it started as a project, and was 
transformed into a policy focusing on women and children even 
though its primary outcomes were for child health. On further 
following up the evolutions in this policy, it was observed that it 
was changed to pay priority attention to maternal health towards 
the end of the MDG period because of poor health outcomes 
for children. The maternal health focus was necessary as it was 
realised that the intended child health goals depended on good 
maternal health outcomes. The HDP supported all the processes 
leading to the new policy.
Abbreviations: MDG, Millennium Development Goal; HDP, 
health development partner.
Box 1. Case Study
“Following his return from heads of state meeting in New 
York in 2005, [name excluded] convened a meeting on 
the state of maternal and newborn health. He tasked the 
Ministry of Health to develop a master plan to address the 
issue of high maternal mortality. Consequently, the Ministry 
of Health, with other sectors and partners, have renewed 
their commitment to addressing maternal health issues and 
has developed a Road Map for Reduction of maternal and 
new-born morbidity and mortality in Uganda” (Extract 
from rationale. Roadmap. p. 22).
One of the consultants who facilitated some of the policy 
processes said: 
“That (changing global policies) is what kept us (Uganda) 
in motion. When it came to policies, we would introduce a 
policy, then [global actor] would come up with another one 
then we would move on to the next before we could realize 
the results another one would come up. It was more of an 
issue of review, revise, abandon and the cycle continued. 
But we also knew that it was not about us being creative to 
change and save mothers from postpartum haemorrhage, 
there are very many factors that come to play” (Interview: 
NC_NO_01).
Altruistic Concern to End Preventable Maternal Death
Across all elite groups there were actors with concern for 
ending preventable maternal death, even those who could 
not influence the policy process. Some HDPs (n = 2) were 
the only ones who succeeded in influencing maternal health 
policies in line with the goal of reducing maternal mortality. 
One of the HDPs said that through financial resources, 
technical expertise and global positioning they had access 
to both policy elites with veto power and those controlling 
the structures of the policy processes. They influenced 
maternal health policies towards the goal of reducing 
maternal mortality by conditioning grants towards policies 
addressing Emergency Obstetric Care and increased access. 
Members of parliament not in executive positions, mid-
level officials of MoH, members of professional associations 
and CSOs observed that although they had good ideas, they 
could not get actors in control of the policy process to take 
up their ideas. Participants from MoH in midlevel positions 
(n = 2) noted that they had concern for ending preventable 
maternal deaths but did not have enough positional power to 
direct policies to this goal. They said they were left to work 
within the policy priorities set by the powerful elites even 
though they were not primarily targeting maternal mortality. 
Other participants who retired from service with MoH (n 
= 2) noted the same. Some members of parliament (n = 3) 
expressed frustration that they were unsuccessful in their 
initiatives to influence other elites to support policy actions 
focused on reducing maternal death. They attributed this to 
a lack of sufficient positional power to exert influence on the 
elites with veto power towards reducing maternal mortality. 
CSOs under the leadership of their peers with legal expertise 
also attempted to influence the policy process toward ending 
preventable maternal death through a 2011 court case 
(Constitutional Petition No. 16). They wanted the courts to 
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declare preventable maternal deaths a violation of the right 
to life by the state. The aim of the petitioners was to secure a 
court decision-making it mandatory for government to ensure 
that every pregnant woman accesses lifesaving interventions 
when they need them Court ruled in their favour. 
Discussion
This paper provides a detailed examination of the elite 
interests and power dynamics that shaped Uganda’s maternal 
health policy-making in the period 2000-2015. It illustrates 
how multiple elite groups exercised power during the policy 
process to influence maternal health policies towards their 
diverse and competing interests. We contend that power in 
its different forms instigated a reconfiguration of the elite 
groups as they engaged in the policy process. In contrast 
to the processes envisaged in Uganda’s formal guidance for 
policy-making, in practice actors controlling the structures 
for policy-making had more power than the rest. Elite groups 
with more power (position, expertise and financial resources) 
were more self-interested and influential while altruistic 
interests tended to be pursued mostly by the less powerful 
elites (and some HDPs). In the end, policies persistently 
yielded incidental benefits for maternal health without 
achieving their set targets.
Elite Formation and Influence in the Policy Process
Centralisation of the policy process with exclusive participation 
of elites is one of the challenges of public policy management 
in Uganda. Central policy elites are organised in different 
formations with varying influence. The control of policy 
processes in Uganda by a few bureaucrats occupying strategic 
positions in government departments loyal to political elites 
continues.39,40 Highly placed bureaucrats tend to have more 
authority, trust by the political elite and control over the 
policy processes and moderate participation of all actors. 
Similar influence was exercised by bureaucrats in Burkina 
Faso during the policy process for integrated community case 
management.41 HDPs operating in Uganda also have access 
to and influence on the structures that control the policy 
process through their consistent participation, technical and 
financial support.1,39,42 The combined influence of key MoH 
bureaucrats and donors is also visible in the Ugandan policy 
processes for human resources for health, disease prevention 
and family planning programmes.2 The experience of the 
abolition of user fees in Uganda shows that elites other than 
donors, political and bureaucratic actors have no significant 
influence on the policy process.43 Our findings show that 
the less powerful elites merely contribute ideas but cannot 
influence the policy process. CSOs, researchers, mid-level 
bureaucrats and professional associations commonly fall into 
this category, and do not influence final decisions.44 Even 
among the groups with significant formal power, such as the 
Ugandan elite group with veto power, not all had influence 
over policy processes. A key finding from this study is that 
the elites who influenced policies often acted in self-interest, 
whilst other actors had limited influence on the policy process. 
Elite Interests and the Exercise of Power in the Policy Process 
This study shows that elites who participated in the policy 
processes for maternal health in Uganda were driven by 
multiple interests. These ranged from political, economic, the 
search for feasible policies and the need to end preventable 
maternal death. The study also advances our understanding 
of the exercise of power by elites to promote these interests 
during the policy process.45
Vote wining is the main political interest that has been 
written about in Uganda. This happens as political and 
bureaucratic elites seek to consolidate and maintain their 
positions for personal gain.40 As observed in other analyses, 
productive sector policy reforms which were likely to 
negatively affect votes in Uganda were dropped in favour 
of those that enhanced opportunities for election victory.46 
Similar to the findings of this study, even when vote winning 
has sometimes influenced policies responding to perceived 
public interests, such policies tend to pursue short-term visible 
results.47 The actors ensure that their policies can clearly be 
linked to them by the voters at the time of seeking political 
support. Similarly, this study shows that the political elite put 
in place policies with interventions that were immediately 
visible and could be linked to their legacies; but with broad 
enough goals to accommodate their interests. 
In addition to political interests, the findings of this study 
reflect earlier Ugandan analyses which showed that in the 
1990s economic interests significantly influenced health 
policy.1 Other analyses show that technocrats in the MoH 
derived personal economic benefit from donor funded policy 
reforms for malaria, Tuberculosis and HIV and AIDS. This 
was treated as their reward for their loyalty to the political 
elite.46 Similarly, for maternal health some officials of the MoH 
were reported to be engaged in donor driven policy reforms 
Table 4. National Policies and Related Global Imperatives in the MDG Period 
Policy Documents Period Global Imperatives 
National health policy 1999-2009 Follow up on primary healthcare 
The national policy guidelines and service standards for reproductive health services 2001-2005 ICPD
The national policy guidelines and service standards for sexual and reproductive health and rights 2006 ICPD and MDGs
Roadmap for accelerating the reduction of maternal and neonatal mortality and morbidity in Uganda 2007-2015 Fast-tracking MDGs 4 and 5
Second national health policy 2010 - to date Alignment with MDGs
Reproductive maternal, new-born and child health sharpened plan for Uganda 2013-2015 Every woman every child
Abbreviations: MDG, Millennium Development Goal; ICPD, International Conference on Population and Development.
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for personal economic gain. This gives room for donors to 
impose policies in furtherance of their global agendas.1,39,40,48 
Since maternal health policy processes involved competing 
actors with diverse interests2,49 actors sometimes pursued 
feasible alternatives (pragmatic interests). In some cases, 
policies were calibrated to fit donor conditionalities.1 Political 
feasibility was also reported as one of the drivers for policy 
reforms in Uganda’s productive sector, requiring balance 
between addressing the actual problem and political goals.46 
In this study, elites were mostly adjusting to fit with donor 
funding streams. Closely relate to the above, some actors 
among the bureaucratic and political elite also sought to 
reduce maternal mortality, as their primary interest. Such 
altruistic behaviours by some elite groups such as professionals 
who engage in policy processes seeking to improve standards 
of care, have also been reported elsewhere in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.29,48 
As noted from the study findings, influence over a specific 
policy process depends on the combination of interests and 
power, as well as the balance of power among elite groups.48,50 
This study shows that the MoH technocrats leading maternal 
health policy processes understood this well. They effectively 
worked around the Ugandan elites with formal veto power 
and the remaining actors in the various policy processes. 
The technocrats took account of the interests of those they 
perceived to be more powerful and bypassed the formal 
policy processes by introducing policies through programme 
documents which would not undergo formal policy scrutiny. 
Given that navigating and serving the personal interests 
of the powerful elite dominated maternal health policy 
processes, this study points to the fact that such processes 
gave rise to “public” policies that did not necessarily wholly 
address a public health problem or serve public interests. 
This contradicts the normative assumption that elites holding 
public positions serve public interests.29,51 Policy elites often 
seek to preserve themselves as a group4,52 and may take into 
consideration public interests if their positions become 
threatened.6 While the public goal and targets of the various 
maternal health policies in Uganda aimed to reduce maternal 
mortality, the multiple personal interests that drove them 
were not primarily intended to reduce maternal mortality. 
Consequently, none of the policies across the fifteen-year 
period examined achieved their written targets on the public 
problem of high maternal mortality. Similarly, public health 
policies on alcohol control in Lesotho, Uganda, Malawi and 
Botswana were heavily influenced by the business interest of 
the alcohol industries and neglected the public interests of 
reducing harmful alcohol consumption and its related health 
problems.53
Limitations 
This paper is informed by the perspectives of national policy-
makers who participated in the maternal health policy 
process during the MDG period. Their views inform our 
conclusions about the influence of Uganda’s policy elites on 
maternal health policies. Given that it derives from the elites 
who directly participated in the policy processes, the study 
brings first-hand experiences of what transpired in the policy 
processes. Analytic rigour was maintained by triangulating 
data across stakeholder groups of the governing and non-
governing elite, and with policy documents covering the 
entire MDG period.
Conclusion 
This study shows that Uganda’s maternal health policies across 
the MDG period were largely influenced by elite personal 
interests and only in a few instances reducing maternal 
mortality. As a consequence, these policies yielded incidental 
benefit for maternal health. This situation emanates from the 
formal guidance for policy-making in Uganda which gives 
elites control over the policy process and so, the latitude to 
determine policy. Citizens are officially excluded from direct 
involvement in policy-making by these guidelines and this 
may explain why public interest did not significantly drive 
maternal policies. 
Addressing maternal health challenges will require stronger 
mechanisms to ensure that public officials do not infuse 
policies with their interests. This entails re-engineering 
the policy process and opening up space for meaningful 
percolation of ideas from the frontline and the public – and 
holding the elite accountable for both the outcomes of the 
policy process and implementation.
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